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Face signatures, including size, shape, texture, skin tone, eye color, appearance, and
scars/marks, are widely used as discriminative, biometric information for access control. Despite recent advancements in facial recognition systems, presentation attacks
on facial recognition systems have become increasingly sophisticated. The ability
to detect presentation attacks or spoofing attempts is a pressing concern for the integrity, security, and trust of facial recognition systems. Multi-spectral imaging has
been previously introduced as a way to improve presentation attack detection by utilizing sensors that are sensitive to different regions of the electromagnetic spectrum
(e.g., visible, near infrared, long-wave infrared). Although multi-spectral presentation attack detection systems may be discriminative, the need for additional sensors
and computational resources substantially increases complexity and costs. Instead,
we propose a method that exploits information from infrared imagery during training
to increase the discriminability of visible-based presentation attack detection systems. We introduce (1) a new cross-domain presentation attack detection framework
that increases the separability of bonafide and presentation attacks using only visible
spectrum imagery, (2) an inverse domain regularization technique for added training
stability when optimizing our cross-domain presentation attack detection framework,
and (3) a dense domain adaptation subnetwork to transform representations between

visible and non-visible domains.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Faces are among the most prevalent biometric modalities (face, iris, fingerprint, voice)
which are used in consumer devices such as personal cell phone, tablet, and computer
identity authentication, as well as in commercial security systems, for airport security,
and at border crossings. One advantage of using faces for biometric recognition is
that acquisition of facial imagery can be contactless, covert and non-intrusive. Currently, deep learning networks are nearing human level performance on face recognition tasks (Taigman et al. (2014); Guo and Zhang (2019)). However, the ubiquity
of facial recognition systems and increasing vulnerabilities, such as identity spoofing
or presentation attacks (PAs), necessitates enhanced security measures to prevent
failures in enrollment, authentication, or identification.
PAs describe the process of altering or obscuring facial signatures to gain access
or evade detection. We study the issue of presentation attack detection (PAD) using
multiple imaging domains to enhance the information in visible imagery to better
differentiate between genuine (bonafide) and attack samples.

2

1.1

Presentation Attack Detection

The primary objective of PAD is to equip biometric systems with the ability to
identify intentional attacks on the system. Because PAs include instances where a
person may be trying to avoid detection, it is necessary to build a system that is
sensitive to intentional obfuscations of appearance. Face PAs can include complete
obfuscations, such as printed image, video replay, or mask style attacks, or partial
obfuscations, such as wearing glasses, make-up, or wigs. The partial obfuscations
are generally more challenging to detect because these attacks are often acceptable
societal behaviors and practices. Figure 1.1 shows several examples of PA instruments.

Figure 1.1: Examples of different PA types that a face biometric system may encounter.
It is evident from Figure 1.1 that some of the PA instruments would not easily
confuse a human observer, but automatic facial recognition systems (without PAD)
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are more susceptible to deception. Especially considering that there are two primary
objectives of PA, to avoid identification, and to spoof another’s identity.

1.2

Multi-Spectral Imaging

Visible light based cameras are ubiquitous, with components proliferating in consumer
electronics, commercial security systems, law enforcement technology, and military
surveillance. Visible cameras convert energy from reflected light in the visible spectrum (400 to 700 nm) to voltage levels that non-linearly map to pixel intensities.
However, cameras can be designed to harness different regions of the electro-magnetic
(EM) spectrum and thus capture different information about the subject. (examples:
thermal, near infrared cameras, radio wave based imaging in astronomy)
Research in heterogeneous face recognition, specifically visible to near infrared
(NIR) and visible to thermal, must overcome differences in quality, resolution, texture, and geometry between these imaging domains [Hu et al. (2017)]. The Structural Similarity (SSIM) Index was developed by Wang et al. (2004) to measure the
“degradation” or structural differences between two images of the same scene. SSIM
evaluates differences in local image structure rather than only using pixel-wise comparisons. Three main components for evaluation are used, luminance, contrast, and
structure, each based on local means and variances.
Given two different images, x and y, SSIM(x,y) is defined as:

SSIM (x, y) =

(2µx µy + C1 )(2σx y + C2 )
(µ2x + µ2y + C1 )(σx2 + σy2 + C2 )

(1.1)

where µx , and µy are the local mean values and σx , σy , and σxy are the local standard deviations. C1 and C2 are constants that are included in the calculation of the
luminance and contrast comparisons to add stability when the squared terms in the
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denominator approach zero. C1 and C2 are determined by
C1 = (K1 L)2 ,

(1.2)

C2 = (K − 2L)2

(1.3)

where L is the dynamic range of the image and K1 and K2 are both small constants
K1 , K2 ≪ 1.
Klare and Jain (2010) and Klare and Jain (2013) have shown that NIR to visible
face recognition can be performed through linear discriminant analysis (LDA) applied on a collection of random subspaces. Results showed that shared or“common”
discriminative projections can be learned such that NIR and visible images can be
matched directly through these subspace projections.

Figure 1.2: Imaging different regions of the electromagnetic spectrum provides different information on the subject.
In Figure 1.3 the domain shift from visible to infrared imagery in PAD data is
shown using a sub-sample of the multi-spectral images used in this research. The
SSIM value is measured between source and target images for the visible to thermal
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(a) SSIM val = 0.374

(b) SSIM val = 0.507

(d) SSIM val = 0.187

(c) SSIM val = 0.342

(e) SSIM val = 0.322

(f) Colorbar

Figure 1.3: SSIM map comparisons where same domain pairs are compared with cross
domain pairs of bonafide face images. (a) Visible to Visible (b) Thermal to Thermal
(c) NIR to NIR (d) Visible to Thermal (e) Visible to NIR
and visible to NIR scenarios. By taking 100 images from each of the presentation
attack sub categories in the WMCA dataset, we also investigate how the domain gap
is effected by the type of attack. The average SSIM value for visible-thermal and
visible-NIR pairs are shown in Table 1.1 for each category.
Both Figure 1.3 and Table 1.1 indicate that generally speaking there is higher
similarity, or a smaller domain gap, between visible and NIR images. This agrees
with the findings in Hu et al. (2017) where bonafide faces were evaluated across
multiple infrared imaging domains.
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Table 1.1: Average SSIM values are computed for each of the presentation sub categories.
Presentation
Bonafide
Facial Disguise
Fake Face
Print
Video
1.2.1

Thermal
0.183
0.155
0.187
0.070
0.086

NIR
0.374
0.303
0.306
0.204
0.187

Near Infrared

Near Infrared (NIR) light inhabits the part of the EM spectrum just beyond visible
light, in the range of 800 to 2,500 nm. Like visible imaging, NIR imaging is still
reliant on reflected energy. An NIR imaging system requires a light source that emits
in the NIR spectrum as well as specialized filters that only transmit within a narrowly
defined range.
Several works have used NIR as well as shortwave infrared (SWIR) as the primary
media for the PAD problem. Steiner et al. (2016) used a SWIR images to perform
”skin detection” as an anti-spoofing pre-processing step for an FR system. Heusch
et al. (2020) uses the shortwave infrared channel (SWIR) of the HQ-WMCA dataset
for PAD. Raghavendra et al. (2017) fused 7 different spectral bands within visible
and NIR wavelengths for pad.

1.2.2

Thermal

Thermal imaging sensors, such as cooled thermal imagers or microbolometers, are
often sensitive to radiation from mid-wave infrared (MWIR) or long-wave infrared
regions of the EM spectrum; 3-5 micron or 7-14 micron respectively.
Thermal images capture information based on the temperature of an object or
scene. Everything warmer than 0 Kelvin radiates thermal energy and the spectral
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emissions are described, in idealized form, by black body radiation. Planck’s law
characterizes black body radiation with the following equation,

Bν (ν, T ) =

1
2hν 3
,
2
hν/kT
c e
−1

(1.4)

where Bν is the spectral radiance for a given frequency and temperature, ν is the
frequency of the electromagnetic radiation, T is the temperature of the black-body, h
is Planck’s constant, and k is the Boltzmann constant. Unlike visible images, thermal
images are acquired using focal plane arrays composed to narrow band gap semiconductors, e.g. indium antimonide (InSb), lead selenide (PbSe), or mercury cadmium
telluride (HgCdTe). These semiconductors convert low energy (0.05-1.3 eV) from
infrared photons to electric voltages which are quantized to discrete pixel intensity
values representing relative (or absolute) surface temperatures. Since thermal focal
plane arrays are sensitive to thermal emissions, the imagery produced lacks the high
frequency detail and texture information present in reflection-dominant (e.g. visible)
imagery.
Images of human faces captured by thermal cameras maintain some basic structures in common with visible face imagery. Boundaries between different regions are
distinguished by changes in temperature from one area to the next. Thermal images
depend a lot more on the content of an object than just the surface appearance, and
regions with high capillary density will appear brighter (warmer) than areas with less
blood flow or that protrude farther from the body (ears, nose). Any areas covered
by hair such as the scalp or chin under a beard appear darker since hair has no
mechanism for producing body heat.
However, a bonafide thermal face signature is significantly more challenging to
fake since simple spoofing mediums, such as print or video based methods, do not
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exhibit heat signatures that resemble human faces.
For this reason, thermal imagery frequently increases the performance of PAD
systems. In one of the first PAD frameworks to use thermal imagery, Dhamecha
et al. (2013) employed a patch-based “biometric” vs. “non-biometric” classification
system that used thermal data to help identify which regions of the face might be
under disguise.

1.3

Multi-Spectral PAD

Despite the benefits of combining information from multi-modal cameras for PAD
applications, the added cost and complexity of using multiple sensors (e.g., visible,
NIR, thermal, and depth) severely limits the use of PAD to local controlled access
environments. Therefore, to leverage current (and future) surveillance camera infrastructure that is mostly comprised of visible cameras, we aim to learn to extract
discriminative information (e.g., infrared imagery) from visible imagery using new
domain adaptation objectives.
Recently, George et al. (2020) introduced the Wide Multi-Channel presentation
Attack (WMCA) dataset that contains both 2D and 3D presentation attacks with
spatially and temporally synchronized imagery across four different sensor domains.
The WMCA dataset contains eight different kinds of presentation attack instruments
(PAIs) that fall under four main categories. These attack categories include facial
disguise (plastic halloween masks, paper glasses, funny eye glasses), fake face (mannequin, flexible silicon masks, paper masks), photo (print/electronic images), and
video.
Other multi-modal PAD datasets include: Casia-Surf(Zhang et al. (2020a)), MLFP
(Agarwal et al. (2017)), Multispectral-Spoof (MSSpoof) (Chingovska et al. (2016)),

9
3DMAD (Erdogmus and Marcel (2013)), as well as Casia-Surf CeFa (Liu et al. (2021)).
Many approaches utilize information from all available imaging modes in order to
carry out the PAD task, which requires complex and expensive sensor suites to perform PAD.
In this work, we enhance the performance of PAD systems that utilize readily available visible spectrum cameras and equipment by harnessing the auxiliary information
present in supplementary image domains during the training process. However, NIR
cameras with filters and thermal cameras need not be present at deployment. Our
primary contributions include:

1.4

Contributions and Thesis Organization

This thesis makes contributions to the problem of face PAD through domain adaptation principles. The proposed framework, including CD-PAD, IDR, and DDA,
enhances visible-based PAD performance by learning to predict information from
discriminative infrared imagery with visible imagery during development. The organization of the following chapters is presented below.
• Chapter 2 lays out the related work that has been done utilizing multi-spectral
PAD imagery and domain adaptation techniques employed in computer vision
applications.
• Chapter 3 formalizes the methods used in the proposed framework and provides
network architecture used.
• Chapter 4 provides details regarding the datasets used in experimentation, ablation studies of architectural components, and both qualitative and quantitave
analysis of experimental results.
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• Chapter 5 includes further discussion into the methods used in this thesis.
• Chapter 6 provides discussion regarding limitations due to data quality.
• Chapter 7 explains the conclusions of the work and potential for further investigation.
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Chapter 2

Background

PAD spans a variety of approaches that harness information from visible cameras as
well as those that rely on input from multi-spectral arrays. This chapter explains the
relevant existing research on different PAD methods starting with those that have
been developed for visible input data and then expanding to multi-modal approaches
that require data from multiple imaging domains. Lastly, we discuss the general
problem of domain adaptation and several approaches that we apply to the PAD
task.

2.1

Visible Spectrum PAD

This section covers prior research in PAD applied to visible imagery which includes
approaches such as image quality/artifact analysis, liveness detection, and SVM and
deep learning methods.

2.1.1

Quality-based Methods

Quality-based, or texture-based, methods encompass approaches to PAD that specialize in two-dimensional(2D) two dimensional attacks by focusing on image degradation.
The unifying theme of these methods is that they recognize that both print attacks
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and video replay attacks introduce subtle patterns that are not present in a bonafide
face sample.
Local Binary Patterns (LBP) is a method originally designed for texture analysis
by Ojala et al. (2002). LBP is an operator that assigns each pixel a value depending
on the pattern of the neighboring pixels (default follows the outer ring of a 3x3 block
surrounding the center pixel, but other radius sizes can be used). Histograms of the
resulting scores were then used to classify the types of patterns seen (various textiles,
scale patterns, animal skin, etc) showing the method to be rotationally invariant.

Figure 2.1: Example of the local binary pattern calculation process for a 3x3 region.
Source Määttä et al. (2011)
LBP was recognized as a useful approach for 2D PAD applications due to the
subtle patterns introduced by the attack media (print, video display) and has driven
early research in texture analysis based approaches to PAD.
Inspired by the assumptions behind classic image de-noising techniques, that a
degraded image can be resolved into the original image and some kind of additive
noise, Jourabloo et al. (2018) developed a method that they call “Face De-spoofing”.
Textures created by the spoofing medium (artifacts due to printing, screen quality)
are treated as a specific type of noise. The spoofing noise was then modeled from
a given attack sample while reconstructing the bonafide face from the spoof image.
The spoof “noise” is used by the system to make a decision regarding the bonafide
status of the presentation.
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Other texture based methods methods (e.g., de Souza et al. (2017)) have used
local binary patterns (LBP) to address 2D attacks, like print or replay PAs. LBP
image representations have been primarily applied to visible imagery for PAD since
infrared and depth imagery exhibit relatively fewer high frequency details (e.g., texture) compared with visible images.
One drawback to texture based methods is that they are primarily equipped to
handle 2D attacks (i.e. print, video replay) and are not suitable for more subtle 3D
attacks. Another issue faced by texture based methods is described by Agarwal et al.
(2019) who show that “that simple intensity transforms such as Gamma correction,
log transform, and brightness control can help an attacker to deceive face presentation
attack detection algorithms.” The Gamma corrections are defined by,

γ
Iout = α · Iin

(2.1)

where α is a constant set to 1, γ = 0.5, and Iin and Iout represent the intensity of a
given input pixel and the intensity of the same pixel after Gamma correction. Log
transformations enhances the darker areas of an image and is defined as,

Iout = c · log(1 + Ii n)

(2.2)

where c is a constant defining the amount of the transformation applied to the image,
c = 2, and 4 in this evaluation.
Atoum et al. (2017) introduced a dual CNN method utilizing randomly selected
local regions from the face. One of the CNNs uses these image patches to generate
individual scores for each patch that rate the likelihood that the given patch came
from a spoof or bonafide image. Dividing the image into smaller pieces addresses
the concern of overfitting caused by many PAD datasets containing a relatively small
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number of subjects (compared to large scale face datasets used for FR). The second
CNN is used to generate an estimation of the depth map for the input face image,
such that bonafide presentations produce a face shaped map and attacks produce a
flat depth map. This approach is suitable for detection of 2D attacks only since a
mask will still produce a depth map resembling that of a human face. Several other
methods Liu et al. (2018), Shao et al. (2019), have similarly used depth estimation
as a regularization technique as one part of their PAD pipeline.
Shao et al. (2019) present a dataset domain generalizing approach that trains on
three combined PAD datasets and is evaluated on a disjoint dataset. The proposed
method used a mutli-adversarial framework to learn the generalized feature space.
This approach also uses depth estimation as an auxiliary regularizing technique for
PAD.
Zero-shot learning refers to the problem where a network learns from a set of
examples of “known” classes and then learns to identify novel classes. Early applications of zero-shot learning to PAD by Arashloo et al. (2017), Xiong and AbdAlmageed
(2018) involved only 2D attacks, where either print or video replay attack types would
be present during training and the remaining attack type evaluated at test time. Liu
et al. (2019) utilized a Deep Tree Network to perform zero-shot face anti-spoofing on
a wider range of attacks that include several kinds of 3D attacks (i.e. multiple mask
types, partial paper obfuscations).

2.1.2

Liveness detection

Liveness detection is a general approach to PAD based on the simple assumption that
by detecting “signs of life” it can be determined whether or not a given presentation is
real. These liveness cues have included: detection of a pulse, eye and head movements,
etc.
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The detection of heart rate using video frames is Remote Photoplethysmography
(rPPG), a technique that hinges on the fact that light reflected from the skin will
have different RGB color values depending on the blood flow beneath the surface.
Liveness detection methods that use rPPG information extract patches from high
arterial density (usually the forehead) for the best chances of detecting a signal.
Liu et al. (2018) use rPPG as a means of auxiliary supervision (in addition to depth
estimation) for a deep learning PAD model. Figure 2.2 illustrates the combined rPPG
and depth estimation approach.

Figure 2.2: Bonafide vs. attack input and liveness signals. Source: Liu et al. (2018)
Heusch and Marcel (2018) apply the method of long-term spectral statistics (LTSS),
first developed for speech based presentation attack detection, as a means of enhancing performance of face presentation attack detection through rPPG signals. LTSS is
a general approach to signal processing, where the discrete Fourier Transform (DFT)
is applied to an input signal, typically audio, to generate the first and second order statistics of the frequency components of the signal. For this study, Heusch and
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Marcel (2018) use three different algorithms to generate the rPPG signals which are
then processed using LTSS. They found that using LTSS in an rPPG based PAD
pipeline improves over other rPPG based methods. The approach has the highest
performance out of rPPG based methods, however it does not meet the state of the
art performance for the datasets used. The authors of the study believe that rPPG
is a promising method against subtle unseen 3D attacks, but there is still progress to
be made.

2.2

Fusion based methods

We define fusion methods as any approach to PAD that utilizes multiple sources of
information (visible, depth, thermal, etc) to make the final decision regarding the
bonafide status of the presentation. Fusion can occur at different levels within the
deep learning pipeline (score level fusion, feature level fusion, data level fusion). Techniques that rely on fusion have the advantages of utilizing complementary information
from different sensing domains, but have the downside of requiring additional sensors
deployed in the system.
Jiang et al. (2019) aimed to harness the complementary information in both visible and near infrared imaging modalities by building a multi-level fusion network.
Information is combined through data level fusion, concatenating visible and NIR images, feature level fusion, concatenating the feature vectors output of the CNN, and
score level fusion, concatenating the scores based on the individual modality inputs.
Three separate branches of the network, sometimes containing two data streams individually, are integrated for this fusion technique to create a model with potentially
high complexity and computational costs. This research does provide useful insight
into which fusion level provides the best benefit. An ablation study shows that the
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results of the score level fusion network are only slightly less accurate than the full
multi-fusion network indicating that while there is a net gain from providing the different levels, the other channels might not provide enough benefit to outweigh the
cost.
Raghavendra et al. (2018) investigated a specific niche of PAD which the authors
refer to as disguise detection. This is specifically the issue of a subject choosing
to adorn their face in such a way that their identity is concealed without creating
an appearance that is obviously unnatural (i.e. facemasks, headcoverings). The
specific mode of presentation attack studied is the application of a realistic false
beard. Data was collected over 8 narrow spectral bands that include both visible
and NIR wavelengths (530 to 1000 nm). The approach is focused on selecting image
regions of 11x11 pixels from the moustache region of the face to train a deeply coupled
autoencoder to generate the spectral signatures of the image patches and ultimately
produce a decision for the presentation. This approach has the limitation of being
tailored to a very specific attack scenario that is not necessarily common for all FR
systems and will not generalize to other attack types.
To quantify the threat to security systems that is actually posed by increasingly
realistic 3D masks Bhattacharjee et al. (2018) created the XCSMAD dataset with
the latest in 3D modeled silicon masks. Using 3D imaging technology, life-like silicon
masks can be manufactured that capture more detail than the cheap, mass produced
masks that had previously been studied for obfuscation attacks. Three popular face
recognition models, VGG-Face, Light CNN, and FaceNet, were evaluated with the
XCSMAD dataset. The end result shows that the FR systems in the study are more
than 10 times as likely to match a silicon mask to a real identity as they are likely
to match a bonafide sample to an incorrect identity. This indicates a vulnerability to
more advanced 3D attacks.
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Kotwal et al. (2019) investigate the problem of increasingly subtle advancements
in the technology behind custom made 3D masks for impersonation attacks. In this
paper, both score level fusion and feature level fusion are evaluated on multi-modal
imagery that includes visible, NIR, high-resolution thermal, and low-resolution thermal images. For the first time, it was proposed to use a pre-trained FR network as a
feature extractor for PAD without fine tuning any layers. Results of single mode ablation studies show that infrared range imaging provides more discriminable features
than visible imagery for the proposed method as well as all of the baseline methods
evaluated.

2.3

Multi-Channel Presentation Attack Detection

In George and Marcel (2021); George et al. (2020) the Multi-Channel Convolutional
Neural Network (MCCNN) was introduced for PAD. First, George et al. (2020) proposed a multi-channel (i.e., multi-modal) fusion approach that combined information
from four imaging modalities: visible, near infrared (NIR), longwave “thermal” infrared (LWIR), and depth to perform PAD using the MCCNN architecture. Then, in
George and Marcel (2021) the MCCNN is used to address the concern of novel “unseen” attacks. For the same purpose, Zhang et al. (2020b) developed an autoencoder
network that utilizes the WMCA dataset to perform anomaly-based spoof detection.
The fundamental difference between these approaches and our work is that they exploit multi-modal imagery during inference. Instead, we exploit multi-modal imagery
offline in order to enhance the discriminability of visible-based PAD.
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2.4

Domain Adaptation

Within the field of deep learning, domain adaptation refers to the task of generalizing
so that the information learned from a source dataset can be applied to a disjoint
dataset with a different underlying distribution, or domain shift. For example, two
datasets that contain the exact same classes (handwritten numbers, cats vs dogs,
etc.) will have statistical differences based on the fact that data collection practices
will differ slightly, lighting conditions change, and so on. This is a significant concern
in areas of study that involve the face, such as facial recognition, where regional and
ethnic differences can affect things like skin tone, facial structure, and hair style to
the extent that it is important to ensure that a deep learning model will perform
appropriately outside of the context on which it was trained.
Transfer learning is a simple approach to domain adaptation where a model that
has been pre-trained on a, usually, large scale dataset is “fine tuned” using a portion
of the target data Weiss et al. (2016). The model parameters do not need to be trained
from scratch, which can be especially useful for applications where the target dataset
is of limited size. This approach is used in Nikisins et al. (2019) where pre-training on
RGB visible imagery creates a base model that is fine tuned on multi-channel PAD
data.
There are several works that recognize that the domain differences between several
visible based PAD datasets is not insignificant. These approaches focus on using domain adaptation techniques to improve dataset generalization for PAD tasks. In this
area of PAD research, four benchmark PAD datasets are used to create four different
evaluation scenarios, where three of the datasets are used in training and one is left
out for evaluation (Wang et al. (2020)). To this end, Mohammadi et al. (2020) used
a “feature divergence measure” based on the symmetric Kullback-Leibler divergence
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of a given filter between domains A and B to address PAD dataset generalization.
Domain adaptation is also used to describe the process of bridging the gap between
different types of data in which the domain gap is much more significant. Here we
study the process of extracting infrared-like features from visible light based imagery.
As expressed in Section 1.2, the differences between the infrared data and visible data
are not trivial and require a nuanced approach to domain adaptation.
In the following sections several existing approaches to domain adaptation are
introduced and will be evaluated in relation to the problem of cross domain PAD in
Chapter 4.

2.4.1

Maximum Mean Discrepancy

The Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) Gretton et al. (2007) is a measure that was
proposed to evaluate the similarity between two distributions by computing distance
between their reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS) embeddings. MMD has been
used as a metric for minimizing the distance between source and target domain representations Long et al. (2013); Rozantsev et al. (2019). A 3D CNN framework for
PAD tasks was introduced in Li et al. (2018) that incorporated MMD regularization
between dataset domains for improved generalization.
Let S = {s1 , ..., sN } and T = {t1 , ..., tN } be the sets of features of the source and
target domains. In this particular problem each set has the same number of elements
N , although in general that need not be the case. Then the squared MMD of S and
T can be expressed as

2
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where k(·, ·) is the kernel associated with the RKHS.
The main disadvantage of MMD is that there is no discrimination between bonafide
and attack instances. Therefore, we investigate an alternative to MMD for domain
adaptation in the context of PAD for facial recognition systems.

2.4.2

Siamese Networks for PAD

Siamese networks (Bromley et al. (1993)) have been used to tackle both domain adaptation problems Motiian et al. (2017) de Freitas Pereira et al. (2019) and PAD tasks
Perez-Cabo et al. (2019). In de Freitas Pereira et al. (2019), a siamese network implementing contrastive loss is used for heterogenous face recognition between different
imaging domains where images are mapped to a shared embedding space. Siamese
networks work well when imaging domains are sufficiently close (see Lezama et al.
(2017)). However, when imaging domains are further apart, they have been shown
to under-perform. Moreover, siamese networks, which are trained to ideally perform
well on multiple domains at the same time, end up performing sub-optimally in all
domains. Instead, we focus on modeling the complex interrelationships between two
domains for PAD.

2.4.3

Domain Invariance Loss

The Domain Invariance Loss (DIL) Fondje et al. (2020); Poster et al. (2021) is a
regularization technique proposed for domain adaptation for thermal-to-visible facial
recognition tasks. DIL uses a domain classification network that learns the probability
that the features produced from an image belong to either the visible (Pvis ) or thermal
domain (Ptherm ). Since the ultimate goal is similarity between the visible and thermal
representations, the domain classifier is trained such that the two distributions are
indistinguishable from each other. Specifically, the domain classification labels are
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constant, i.e., Pvis = Ptherm = 0.5. The potential disadvantage of this approach is that
the labels are always the same, which implies there is a risk of models never learning
patterns associated with either domain. Therefore, we consider an alternative where
such patterns are learned and used in a regularizing fashion.
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Chapter 3

Cross-Domain Presentation Attack Detection Framework

The proposed PAD framework (Fig. 3.1) aims to enhance visible-based PAD using new “high-level” domain adaptation principles. First, we define the problem:
cross-domain presentation attack detection (CD-PAD). Then, we introduce the core
components of our framework:
1. a base network architecture–to extract discriminative image representations,
2. a new dense domain adaptation (DDA) subnetwork–to learn a mapping between
visible (source) and infrared (target) imagery,
3. a new CD-PAD objective function–to encourage task-level (i.e., inference level)
domain adaptation,
4. a new inverse domain regularization function– to disentangle spectral information (domain specific) from PA information.

3.1

Preliminaries

Enhancing PAD performance from visible spectrum imagery requires exploitation of
subtle cues (e.g., specular reflections) to differentiate between bonafide faces and PAs.
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Figure 3.1: Schematic of CD-PAD with IDR regularization. The gray layers represent
the convolutional layers that are not re-trained. All blue layers (DDA subnet, IDR,
and CD-PAD classifier layers) are adapted during training. The DDA subnet is
inserted into the inference model to learn the transformation of source imagery to the
target embedding space. Bounding boxes at the output visually represent the final
decision of the network.
To emphasize such subtle cues, we introduce a new CD-PAD framework. The CDPAD problem is where discriminative information from a target domain is used to
boost the quality of information extracted from the source domain. For example, by
predicting infrared image representations from visible imagery, CD-PAD significantly
improves the quality of visible-based PAD and reduces PAD system complexity (e.g.
number/type of sensors) and cost.
Let S = {xs1 , xs2 , . . . , xsn } and T = {xt1 , xt2 , . . . , xtm } denote the sets of source (e.g.,
visible) and target (e.g., infrared) domain images, respectively. Here, n is the number
of images from the source domain and m is the number of images from the target
domain.
Let (xsi , xtj ) denote a pair of source and target images with corresponding labels
yis and yjt . Unlike methods that use restrictive Euclidean distance metrics to bridge
domain gaps, CD-PAD performs inference level domain adaptation which relaxes the
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requirements for precise image registration/alignment and synchronous acquisition.
Instead, the key requirement for CD-PAD is that both source and target labels sets,
denoted by Y s and Y t respectively, must have overlapping labels. Mathematically,
this requirement is
Y t ⊇ Y s,

(3.1)

where y t ∈ Y t and y s ∈ Y s .
The main goal under our proposed CD-PAD framework is to learn a target domain
PAD classifier, P (y t |ft (xtj )) that is sufficiently discriminative when used with source
domain data, i.e., P (y t |fs (xsi )), where ft is the mapping from the target domain to the
associated latent subspace and fs maps source imagery to the same “target” latent
subspace. The primary objective for CD-PAD is to find an optimal source-to-target
mapping fs , such that fs (xsi ) ≈ ft (xtj ).

3.2

Base Architecture

George et al. (2020) showed that additional spectral data can increase the discriminative power of multi-modal PAD systems. However, many extant security systems
employ visible spectrum cameras and use visible enrollment face imagery. Therefore,
we propose a method that consists of training a PAD network to extract discriminative (e.g, infrared) representations from visible imagery while leveraging non-visible
information only during training. The network contains two nearly identical data
streams—one for processing source imagery and one for target imagery—consisting
of CNNs with architectures based on the Light CNN network (Wu et al. (2018)).
Both streams are fed into the proposed CD-PAD classifier. The primary difference is
that the source stream is modified to include the addition of the DDA subnetwork,
which is described in section 3.3.
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Table 3.1: Light CNN Architecture for 124 × 118 pixel image
Layer
Conv1
MFM1
Pool1
Resblock1
Conv2a
MFM2a
Conv2
MFM2
Pool2
Resblock2
Conv3a
MFM3a
Conv3
MFM3
Pool3
Resblock3
Conv4a
MFM4a
Conv4
MFM4
Resblock4
Conv5a
MFM5a
Conv5
MFM5
Pool4
Linear
MFM6

Filter Size
/Stride
5 × 5/1
—
 2 × 2/2

3 × 3/1
×1
3 × 3/1
1 × 1/1
—
3 × 3/1
—
2
×
2/2


3 × 3/1
×2
3 × 3/1
1 × 1/1
—
3 × 3/1
—
 2 × 2/2

3 × 3/1
×3
3 × 3/1
1 × 1/1
—
3 × 3/1
—

3 × 3/1
×4
3 × 3/1
1 × 1/1
—
3 × 3/1
—
2 × 2/2
—
—

Output Shape
(H × W × C)
124 × 118 × 96
124 × 118 × 48
62 × 59 × 48

Params

62 × 59 × 48

83,136

62 × 59 × 96
62 × 59 × 48
62 × 59 × 192
62 ×59 × 96
31 × 30 × 96

4,704
–
83,136
–
–

31× 30 × 96

332,160

31 × 30 × 192
31 × 30 × 96
31 × 30 × 384
31 × 30 × 192
16 × 15 × 192

18,624
–
332,160
–
–

16 × 15 × 192

1,327,872

16
16
16
16

×
×
×
×

×
×
×
×

384
192
256
128

74,112
–
442,624
–

16 × 15 × 128

590,336

16
16
16
16
8

×
×
×
×
×

15
15
15
15

2,496
–
–

15 × 256
15 × 128
15 × 256
15 × 128
8 × 128
512
256

33,024
–
295,168
–
–
4,194,816
–

The Light CNN is a deep learning model that was designed to tackle face recognition, while also being robust to the issue of noisy labels in large face datasets and
maintaining a small footprint with respect to storage requirements and computational
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complexity. A major advantage of Light CNN is the application of the Max Feature
Map (MFM) activation function. The MFM layer implements a type of neural inhibition by taking two feature maps and only passing the element-wise maximum values
to the next layer. The MFM operating on two input feature maps can be expressed
mathematically as,
k+N
xˆkij = max(xkij , xij
).

(3.2)

Figure 3.2 shows the MFM process. Several works including those by, Kotwal et al.
(2019), George et al. (2020), and Kotwal et al. (2020) have found that Light CNN
makes a favorable feature extractor for PAD when the model is pre-trained for face
recognition.

Figure 3.2: Shown are the two types of MFM used in Light CNN. Left: MFM 1/2
favors the strongest out of two neuron activations. Right: MFM 2/3 only suppresses
one neuron out of three and keeps the two highest values. Source: Wu et al. (2018)
We use the Light CNN weights that have been pre-trained on the MSCeleb-1M
dataset (Wu et al. (2018)), which is a large-scale face dataset containing 10 million
images, as the feature extractor for both streams of the CD-PAD network. Then,
transfer learning is applied to both streams to re-use relevant model parameters. This
approach is similar to that used by George et al. (2020), except that our two-stream
network is trained in a domain adaptive manner instead of a multi-modal fusion
manner, meaning that only visible imagery is required during deployment opposed to
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requiring both visible and infrared imagery. Table 3.1 summarizes each layer of the
Light CNN architecture, which is comprised of convolution (Conv), Max-Feature-Map
(MFM), max pooling, and residual layers.

3.3

DDA Sub-network

We select a developed architecture that would best enable the network to learn the
mapping from source to target domain considering the constraints of the problem.
In the simplest architecture, one layer connects directly to the next such that information flows in the following manner. The input and output of a given layer can be
represented by the equations
yi = A(xi−1 ),

(3.3)

xi−1 = Wi−1 · xi−1

(3.4)

where y is the post-activation for a given layer and x is the pre-activation, A()˙ is
the nonlinear activation function of the layer, and Wi−1 represents the layer weights.
This works just fine for small networks. However, the problem of vanishing gradient
arises as networks grow deeper.
We explore two different connection types for cross domain PAD.
Dense connection – each layer l is connected to all previous (L − l) layers.
yi = A([x0 , x1 , . . . , xi−1 ])
Residual connection – The activation of layer l is summed with its input.
yi = A(xi−1 ) + xi−1
Dense connections in neural networks were introduced by Huang et al. (2017)
to address the vanishing gradient issue by giving each layer a direct connection to
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the objective function. Due to the information sharing from concatenating all of the
feature maps from previous layers, densely connected networks can perform well with
fewer parameters than other leading architectures.
He et al. (2016) took a different approach to the problem of vanishing gradients
and degradation faced by deep networks. The authors restrict the layers of their
network to explicitly fit a residual mapping F(x) + x. These networks employ skip
connections to build residual blocks, shown in Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3: The basic building block of a Residual Network. Source: He et al. (2016)

Table 3.2: DDA Subnetwork Architecture for 124 × 118 pixel image
Layer
BatchN orm
δconv1
δconv2
δconv3
δconv4
δ

Inputs
Pool3
BatchN orm
δconv1
[δconv1 , δconv2 ]
[δconv1 , δconv2 , δconv3 ]
[δconv1 , δconv2 , δconv3 , δconv4 ]

Output Shape
16 × 15 × 192
16 × 15 × 48
16 × 15 × 48
16 × 15 × 48
16 × 15 × 48
16 × 15 × 192

Params
384
82,992
20,784
41,520
62,256
—

A domain adaptive subnetwork is added to the visible (source) stream of the CDPAD network to learn the mapping from the source to target domain. We propose
a new Dense Domain Adapation (DDA) subnetwork which is composed of a dense
block Huang et al. (2017) that consists of four convolutional layers as shown in Table
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3.2. Mathematically, the DDA subnetwork is represented as
δ(u) = Concat{δconv1 (u), δconv2 (u),
(3.5)
δconv3(u) , δconv4 (u)},
where

δconv1 (u) = ReLU (Conv(BatchN orm(u))),

(3.6)

δconv2 (u) = ReLU (Conv(δconv1 (u))),

(3.7)

δconv3 (u) = ReLU (Conv([δconv2 (u), δconv1 (u)])),

(3.8)

δconv4 (u) = ReLU (Conv([δconv3 (u), δconv2 (u), δconv1 (u)])),

(3.9)

with Conv(·) respresenting a 3 × 3 convolution and ReLU (·) the rectified linear unit
activation function. The parameters of the DDA subnetwork are optimized using our
proposed CD-PAD loss (section 3.4).
The DDA subnetwork (Eq. 3.5) is motivated by the Residual Spectrum Transform
(RST) subnetwork used by Fondje et al. (2020) who introduced a residual transformation [He et al. (2016)] based subnetwork to bridge domain gaps for thermal-to-visible
face recognition. The effects of subnetwork type (i.e., residual versus dense) and placement within the Light CNN on the overall performance of CD-PAD are described in
Section 4.6.2. The dense architecture was selected for the DDA subnetwork primarily
due to superior performance observed in the context of cross domain PAD.
The DDA subnetwork receives the output of the Pool3 max pooling layer shown in
the Light CNN architecture in Table 3.1 as input to the BatchNorm layer. The dense
output of DDA is then passed to the Resblock3 layer of Light CNN and through the
remainder of the network. Figure 3.4 illustrates the connections between the layers
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Figure 3.4: Diagram showing the connections between densely connected layers of
the DDA subnetwork
of the DDA subnetwork.

3.4

Cross Domain Presentation Attack Detection

The proposed CD-PAD framework alternates training between the source and target
domains to optimize information extracted from target domain face imagery to guide
the adaptation of source domain representations. First, the PAD classifier is trained
exclusively on the target data. The target domain classifier and Light CNN are trained
in a manner to avoid over-fitting to the target data. We found that over-training on
target data can lead to under-performing on source imagery (i.e., visible based PAD).
Results from detailed source-target trade off ablation studies (shown in section 4.6.1)
indicate when the target learning phase of training is complete. The PAD classifier
weights are optimized by minimizing the Binary Cross Entropy (BCE) loss function
between the labels and predictions by,
L(xt , y t ) =(1 − y t ) log(1 − f (xt ; wt ))
(3.10)
+ y t log(f (xt ; wt )),
where xt and y t are the source and target input images and labels from Section 3.1
and wt refers to the classifier weights that are trained using the target imagery.
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After this initial phase, the trained classifier optimizes the parameters of the DDA
subnetwork that transform the source domain image representations to representations to exhibit properties similar to target domain imagery. In the domain adaptive
phase, the classifier weights, wt , remain fixed so that the objective function can only
be minimized by transforming the feature representation of the visible domain. For
the domain adaptive training, the BCE loss function is
L(xs , y s ) =(1 − y s ) log(1 − f (xs ; wt ))
(3.11)
s

s

t

+ y log(f (x ; w )),
where wt represents the classifier parameter weights that had previously been trained
on the target data.
The CD-PAD framework ultimately works due to the fundamental assumption in
Eq. 3.1, where we assume that both target and source domain span the same label
sets. Due to the asynchronous, alternating training strategy used by CD-PAD, target
and source imagery are not required to be precisely synchronized or co-registered.
Therefore, CD-PAD is more flexible and extensible than existing domain adaptation methodologies, especially those that optimize Euclidean distances between corresponding pairs or triplets.
After training the CD-PAD framework, only the source stream (i.e., inference
model in Fig. 3.1) is used for deployment of the PAD system. This provides a very
efficient and cost effective solution for PAD.

3.5

Inverse Domain Regularization

Lastly, we propose a new inverse domain regularization(IDR) technique that aims to
help guide the transformation of source domain representations to the target domain
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subspace. Unlike Fondje et al. (2020) who used domain invariance loss to force a
matching domain classification for both domains, we train a domain classifier to correctly differentiate between source and target domains. After learning the distinction,
inverting the labels of the source data is what drives the domain adaptation provided
by IDR.
First, the IDR domain classifier is trained with correct domain labels for each of
the input images and learns to appropriately discriminate between the two domains.
Using the same notation from Section 3.1, let P t (xi ) be the probability that a given
training image xi comes from the target domain. The IDR classifier is trained to
predict P t (xsi ) = 0 and P t (xti ) = 1, a correct classification of the feature domains
for each of the input images. Next, in order to guide the network to map the source
images to the target feature space, we implement the domain inversion of IDR. In this
domain adaptive stage of training, the domain classifier parameters are fixed while the
DDA subnetwork is updated. Here, the labels for the source images are intentionally
labeled incorrectly as target images. The DDA subnetwork in the source channel
must then adapt to transform the source features so that they will be identified as
the target class by the domain classifier, or mathematically, that P t (xsi ) = 1. The
bottom line is that IDR aims to reduce differences between source and target image
representations in a class agnostic manner and thus complements the CD-PAD loss
by imposing additional constraints.

34

Chapter 4

Experiments and Results

In this Chapter we describe the datasets used for evaluation of the CD-PAD method
as well as the evaluation metrics that measure performance. Both qualitative and
quantitative results for the full CD-PAD framework are presented in Sections 4.4 and
4.5. Lastly, multiple ablation studies evaluating the effects of different components
of the CD-PAD framework are included in Section 4.6.

4.1

Datasets

To train any deep learning model, obtaining a dataset of sufficient size and quality is
important. The best Presentation Attack datasets contain several modes of attacks,
offering the ability to predict how a network will perform on an unknown or “unseen”
attack type. For this project we focus only on PAD datasets that contain both visible
and infrared imagery. Information about the datasets used for analysis is provided in
Sections 4.1.1 through ??.

4.1.1

WMCA

For training and evaluation on the WMCA dataset, the “grandtest” protocol referred
to by George et al. (2020) is used. The data is split into three subsets: train, dev,

35
and test. For each domain, the subsets contain 28,223, 27,850, and 27,740 images
respectively. The distribution of attack categories are consistent across each of the
sets and individual subjects do not appear in multiple subsets. The test subset
contains 5,750 bonafide images, 1,649 facial disguise images, 13,041 fake face images,
4,200 photo attack images, and 3,100 video attack images.

4.1.2

MSSpoof

To show CD-PAD’s potential for generalization, we also evaluate on the MSSpoof
(Chingovska et al. (2016)) dataset. MSSpoof contains both visible and NIR imagery
of 21 individuals. Like WMCA, MSSpoof is split into three identity disjoint subsets:
train, dev, and test. All of the PAs in the MSSpoof dataset are print style attacks.
The training subset contains 594 visible images and 577 NIR images, the dev subset
contains 398 visible images and 395 NIR images, and the test subset contains 396
visible images and 395 NIR images.

4.1.3

CASIA-SURF

CASIA-SURF is a largescale PAD dataset that contains three different imaging
modalities: depth, NIR, and visible. All the attack types are variations of the standard print attack where a printed photograph is presented to the FR system. The
print attacks in CASIA-SURF can be split in to 3 categories: photos with eye regions
cut out, photos with eyes and nose cut out, and photos with eyes, nose, and mouth
cut out. The dataset contains 1000 unique subjects and a total of 492,522 images.
For evaluation, the data is split so that the training subset contains bonafide
faces and only half of the attack types (curved print with eyes/mouth/nose cut, flat
print with eye/mouth/nose cut, and curved print with eyes/nose cut) so that the test
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and validation subsets contain unseen attacks. Additionally there are 2 evaluation
protocols for both within modal and cross modal evaluation

4.2

Implementation

All models were trained in PyTorch (Paszke et al. (2019)) and updated using the
ADAM optimizer (Kingma and Ba (2015)) with a learning rate of 1x10−4 . Features
were generated using the Light CNN (Wu et al. (2018)) framework initialized with
weights pre-trained for facial recognition. During the first phase of training, the
fully-connected PAD classification layers are trained on thermal data. In the final
cross domain training stage the weights of the DDA subnetwork in the visible data
stream are made trainable. The second stage of training uses the same optimizer
and learning rate. Networks trained with inverse domain regularization required an
additional stage of training, wherein only layers in the parallel domain classification
network are updated. Data augmentation is utilized during training with random
horizontal flipping with a probability of 0.5, and random rotation of maximum 10
degrees.
Preprocessing on the MSSpoof dataset included 5-point facial landmark registration and tight cropping around the face. Image cropping is utilized to alleviate
potential problems with over-fitting as a result of the limited quantity of data in
MSSpoof. Restricting the network to only learn from information contained in the
face prevents it from focusing on background details that are often dataset specific.
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4.3
4.3.1

Evaluation Metrics
ROC Analysis

The Reciever Operating Characteristic curve (ROC curve) is a tool used to analyze
the performance of binary classification systems. The ROC curve is a plot of the True
Positive Rate (TPR) vs. False Positive Rate (FPR) where the decision threshold τ is
swept from the minimum to the maximum value of the decision scores that are under
evaluation. In a binary classification system there are four different decision scenarios
that relate to the ROC analysis. For input where the ground truth label is positive,
the system may either return a positive or negative score producing True Positive
(TP) or False Negative (FN) decisions respectively. Alternately a sample might have
a ground truth label of negative. Then a positive score would give a False Positive
(FP) decision and a negative score would give a True Negative (TN) decision. The
FPR and TPR are given by the equations,

T P R(τ ) =

T P (τ )
,
T P (τ ) + F N (τ )

(4.1)

F P R(τ ) =

F P (τ )
.
F N (τ ) + T N (τ )

(4.2)

where τ is the decision threshold.

4.3.2

ACER Metrics

Results are reported according to the ISO/IEC 30107-3 standard metrics for presentation attack detection, Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER),
Bonafide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER), and the Average Classification Error Rate (ACER) ISO/IEC 30107-3:2017. APCER designates the proportion
of presentation attacks incorrectly identified as bonafide presentations, and BPCER
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is the proportion of incorrectly identified bonafide presentations. The metrics are
defined as follows:

AP CER(τ ) =

F P (τ )
,
F P (τ ) + T N (τ )

(4.3)

BP CER(τ ) =

F N (τ )
,
F N (τ ) + T P (τ )

(4.4)

ACER(τ ) =

AP CER(τ ) + BP CER(τ )
,
2

(4.5)

where FN, FP, TN, and TP are the number of false negatives, false positives, true
negatives, and true positives for a given threshold τ as introduced in Sec. 4.3.1.
Results are reported by giving the BPCER value at selected APCER values of
1% and 5%. This provides a consistent operating point for comparison in the ROC
curves and provides insight into the performance at both a low and slightly less strict
false positive rate.

4.4

Qualitative Analysis

Quantitative metrics are important for providing a hard line of comparison between
different methods, but do not always give the full picture behind the performance of
a model. In this section we present qualitative analysis of the models that provide
more visual context for the performance.

4.4.1

WMCA

To illustrate the enhancements due to CD-PAD, we evaluate the feature representations of the visible imagery (bonafide and PA samples) using the t-Distributed
Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE) (van der Maaten and Hinton (2008)) method
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to visualize the data. The t-SNE representations for the visible baseline and the CDPAD adapted visible features are shown in Fig. 4.1. Data samples used for the
t-SNE visualization are randomly selected from the test set. The adapted features
are generated from a CD-PAD + IDR network trained with thermal imagery as the
target domain. It is clear from the plots that the cross domain adaptation causes
the bonafide samples to be more tightly clustered in the feature space and have less
overlap with the attack samples.

Figure 4.1: Compared to the single mode visible baseline, our method shows better
separability between bonafide and all attack data points.
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4.4.2

MSSPOOF

To illustrate the effects of the CD-PAD framework, analysis of the raw predictions for
the MSSPOOF test set are shown. Since PAD is treated as a 2 class (binary) problem,
the final layer generates a confidence score in the range of [0,1] that indicates whether
or not the image is a bonafide presentation.

Figure 4.2: Histograms showing the distribution of scores
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4.5

Quantitative Results

Next, we compare the performance of CD-PAD with visible and infrared (thermal or
NIR) baseline models using WMCA and MSSpoof. The thermal and NIR specific
models represent the upper performance bounds that can be attained by adapting
visible data via our CD-PAD framework.

4.5.1

WMCA

We compare the results of the CD-PAD method using two different target domains,
thermal and NIR, against networks trained for the PAD task on single modal data.
The CD-PAD method improves upon the quality of the attack detector when only
visible data is available in a deployment scenario.
Table 4.1: CD-PAD results where NIR is the target domain using the WMCA dataset
Method
MCCNN(NIR)
George et al. (2020)
MCCNN(Visible)
George et al. (2020)
Siamese network
CD-PAD
CD-PAD+DIL
CD-PAD+MMD
CD-PAD+IDR

BPCER @
1% APCER
5.93 ± 6.54

BPCER @
5% APCER
1.54 ± 1.94

AUC
0.997 ± 0.003

74.59 ± 9.87

43.72 ± 9.43

0.895 ± 0.029

26.08 ± 3.16
18.7 ± 1.77
19.84 ± 0.34
20.9 ± 4.1
17.13± 1.38

11.18 ± 1.97
9.95 ± 1.31
11.2 ± 1.41
13.1 ± 2.24
9.27 ± 2.13

0.957 ±0.008
0.962 ± 0.008
0.970 ± 0.002
0.977 ± 0.001
0.980 ± 0.000

The effects of using NIR imagery as the visible adaptation target are shown in
Table 4.1. The CD-PAD network greatly improves over the visible baseline. With
NIR as the target domain CD-PAD achieves an average of 18.7% BPCER at a 1%
APCER operating point, improving over the visible baseline by 55.89%. Adding IDR
to the CD-PAD framweork results in an additional improvement of 1.57%.
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Table 4.2: CD-PAD results where thermal is the target domain using the WMCA
dataset
Method
MCCNN(Thermal)
George et al. (2020)
MCCNN(Visible)
George et al. (2020)
Siamese network
CD-PAD
CD-PAD+DIL
CD-PAD+MMD
CD-PAD+IDR

BPCER @
1% APCER
3.83 ± 2.45

BPCER @
5% APCER
0.0 ± 0.0

AUC
0.998 ± 0.001

74.59 ± 9.87

43.72 ± 9.43

0.895 ± 0.029

36.18 ± 3.17
24.3 ± 2.36
19.31 ± 1.25
48.24 ± 0.79
12.42 ± 0.52

19.89 ± 6.86
8.75 ± 1.64
7.88 ± 2.83
23.4 ± 1.98
6.90 ± 1.56

0.939 ± 0.014
0.973 ± 0.003
0.981 ± 0.006
0.948 ± 0.001
0.982 ± 0.007

Table 4.2 shows the results when thermal imagery is available for cross domain
training. When CD-PAD is used on its own, the visible based PAD results are
boosted. CD-PAD shows a marked improvement in the BPCER at low APCER
operating points in the ROC curve. CD-PAD achieves an average of 24.3% BPCER
at a 1% APCER operating point, and improves by 50.29% over the visible baseline.
Including additional domain adaptation loss components had varying effects on the
CD-PAD performance. Introducing MMD to help guide domain adaptation actually
hurt performance. However, the combination of CD-PAD and IDR using the thermal
target imagery achieved the biggest improvement in visible based PAD on WMCA
decreasing the BPCER at a 1% APCER by 62.17%.

4.5.2

MSSpoof

In Table 4.3, we evaluate the CD-PAD method using the MSSpoof dataset where
visible source imagery is adapted to the target NIR domain. Once again, CD-PAD
improves upon training the model on visible imagery alone. The network trained on
visible imagery achieves an average of 42.85% BPCER at a 1% APCER operating
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point, and the CD-PAD network achieves 13.75% for the same metric. Adding IDR to
the CD-PAD framework offers a small performance boost to the BPCER score at 1%
APCER, improving the CD-PAD performance by 0.27%. The overall improvement
due to CD-PAD + IDR
Table 4.3: CD-PAD results using MSSpoof. NIR is the target domain.
Method
MCCNN(NIR)
George et al. (2020)
MCCNN(Visible)
George et al. (2020)
CD-PAD
CD-PAD+DIL
CD-PAD+MMD
CD-PAD+IDR

4.5.3

BPCER @
1% APCER
16.27 ± 3.74

BPCER @
5% APCER
12.09 ± 3.1

AUC
0.977 ± 0.003

42.85 ± 0.54

27.67 ± 0.51

0.891 ± 0.025

13.75 ± 0.59
14.74 ± 2.39
28.36 ± 3.76
13.48 ± 2.02

9.25 ± 0.3
8.11 ± 0.81
17.54 ± 0.26
10.46 ± 2.64

0.987 ± 0.001
0.987 ± 0.001
0.976 ± 0.037
0.987 ± 0.002

CASIA-Surf

Table 4.4: CD-PAD results on Casia-Surf, where NIR is the target domain.
Method
MCCNN(NIR)
George et al. (2020)
MCCNN(Visible)
George et al. (2020)
NIR (with DDA)
Visible (with DDA)
CD-PAD*
CD-PAD*+DIL
CD-PAD*+MMD
CD-PAD*+IDR

BPCER @
1% APCER
85.98± 0.07

BPCER @
5% APCER
65.93 ± 3.78

AUC
0.843 ± 0.028

65.64 ± 12.79

39.35 ± 15.89

0.911 ± 0.048

19.42 ± 9.93
63.16 ± 11.01
55.22 ± 4.2

3.64 ± 2.41
35.66 ± 13.95
21.94 ± 2.4

58.40 ± 1.53
74.10 ± 1.36
78.7 ± 5.78

29.9 ± 0.45
33.87 ± 1.70
36.14 ± 5.61

0.991 ± 0.004
0.923 ± 0.042
0.957 ±
0.003
0.944 ± 0.000
0.939 ± 0.002
0.929 ± 0.007

Table 4.4 shows the results of the CD-PAD method with adjustments made to
accommodate changes in image quality in the CASIA-Surf dataset (CD-PAD* indi-
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cates that the CD-PAD method involves two DDA subnetworks). Additional analysis
into the motivations behind the changes made to CD-PAD is explained in Chapter 5. In the original single mode baselines, the network struggled to sufficiently
learn from the target data in order to offer an improvement through cross domain
training. For the experiment on CASIA-Surf, a DDA subnetwork is added to both
streams of the CD-PAD network. These subnetworks learn different transformations
and are not “shared” between the source and target streams. In this situation, the
best improvement is achieved by the CD-PAD framework without additional domain
regularization reducing the BPCER at 1% APCER by 7.94% and BPCER at 5%
APCER by 13.72%.

4.6

Discussion and Analysis

This section covers the analysis and ablation studies that went into developing the
CD-PAD framework. First, we analyze the trade-off on performance on the source
(visible) data when training at different durations on target imagery. Second, we
consider the CD-PAD method with and without various configurations of the DDA
subnetwork placed at varying depths in the base network architecture. Third, we
evaluate the performance of the network when changing the dimensionality of the
final embedding representation produced by the CD-PAD network.

4.6.1

Source-Target Trade Off Analysis

The key to CD-PAD is to find an IR-like embedding space that enhances the discriminability of visible imagery. In Section 4.5, it is shown that the single mode IR
baselines significantly outperform the single mode visible baseline. We consider the
NIR and thermal baselines as an upper limit of what can be achieved through cross
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domain training. In Section 1.2 we used SSIM to show the domain gap between visible
and infrared imaging modalities.
Table 4.5: Varying training epochs used in Target learning stage of CD-PAD for
WMCA with NIR target domain without using the DDA subnet and finetuning LCNN
layers
Target Epochs
1
5
10

BPCER @
1% APCER
68.52 ± 1.95
65.65 ± 1.21
55.36 ± 5.38

15
20
25

52.49 ± 4.45
57.30 ± 2.76
64.17 ± 2.59

BPCER @
5% APCER
45.85 ± 0.94
52.27 ± 2.48
35.73 ±
10.99
40.92 ± 1.69
38.41 ± 1.88
45.26 ± 10.40

AUC
0.884 ± 0.006
0.848 ± 0.003
0.909 ±
0.032
0.908 ± 0.009
0.908 ± 0.016
0.884 ± 0.002

Table 4.6: Varying training epochs used in Target learning stage of CD-PAD for
WMCA with Thermal target domain without the DDA subnet
Epochs Stage 1
1
5
10
15
20
25

BPCER @
1% APCER
86.66 ± 3.26
56.82 ± 13.37
73.83 ± 3.34
46.23 ±
3.01
54.16 ± 7.46
60.87 ± 4.43

BPCER @
5% APCER
73.65 ± 3.85
41.46 ± 12.05
54.29 ± 1.73
32.87 ±
6.23
39.94 ± 6.72
39.08 ± 8.46

AUC
0.763 ± 0.026
0.895 ± 0.033
0.881 ± 0.009
0.917 ±
0.013
0.905 ± 0.021
0.910 ± 0.012

In Table 4.5 and 4.6 results are shown for the CD-PAD method before adding
the DDA subnet, instead layers of the Light CNN are made trainable to transform
source representations. In both cases, performance declines beyond 15 epochs of
initial classifier training on target data.
In Tables 4.8 and 4.7, the DDA subnet is incorporated into the CD-PAD framework to generate the results shown. The inclusion of the DDA subnetwork makes the
overall approach less sensitive to the issue of overtraining on target imagery. Per-
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Table 4.7: Varying training epochs used in Target learning stage of CD-PAD for
WMCA with Thermal target domain with the DDA subnet in use
Target Epochs
1
5
10
15
20
25

BPCER @
1% APCER
40.10 ± 5.81
26.43 ± 4.02
26.02 ±
0.28
26.61 ± 8.64
27.48 ± 1.08
26.46 ± 0.47

BPCER @
5% APCER
16.61 ± 5.31
11.55 ± 3.71
9.72 ± 3.99
14.62 ± 4.70
10.46 ± 2.39
12.87 ± 1.36

AUC
0.945 ± 0.010
0.964 ± 0.010
0.971 ±
0.009
0.954 ± 0.013
0.969 ± 0.001
0.962 ± 0.001

Table 4.8: Varying training epochs used in Target learning stage of CD-PAD for
WMCA with NIR target domain when using the DDA subnet
Target Epochs
1
5
10
15
20
25

BPCER @
1% APCER
24.04 ± 6.86
20.04 ± 2.30
18.09 ±
5.50
19.71 ± 1.07
28.94 ± 1.78
23.01 ± 2.90

BPCER @
5% APCER
13.53 ± 3.83
12.70 ± 3.44
12.57 ±
4.66
11.64 ± 1.92
15.14 ± 1.37
8.87 ± 0.05

AUC
0.960± 0.018
0.971 ± 0.008
0.964 ±
0.015
0.967 ± 0.001
0.955 ± 0.001
0.973 ± 0.004

formance peaks after 10 epochs, however continued training on target imagery only
causes the results to plateau instead of the steady increase in error rate seen when
trained without the subnet.

4.6.2

Subnetwork Ablation Study

A subnetwork ablation study was conducted to determine the optimal layer depth at
which to insert a domain adaptive subnetwork into the visible channel of the CD-PAD
network, and to evaluate different potential subnetwork architectures. The Light CNN
network contains four max pooling layers that conclude each convolutional block. For
each test, a trainable subnetwork is placed directly after one of the max pooling layers
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to learn the transformation from the source to target domain. When a subnetwork is
used for domain adaptation, all of the pre-trained layers in the network remain fixed
during training.
Table 4.9 shows the effects of subnetwork type (residual or dense) and location
when using the CD-PAD method. For this ablation study, additional regularizing loss
functions are not implemented in the domain adaptive phase of training in order to
highlight the change in performance that can be attributed to the network architecture
alone.
For both architectures, the domain adaptive subnetwork shows the greatest effect
when placed after the third pooling layer in the Light CNN. The most drastic improvements are seen in the lowest false positive rates where the CD-PAD network struggles
without having the support of additional domain regularization. All of the final results presented for the CD-PAD framework are generated using the domain adaptive
block at the third max pooling layer, which we refer to as the DDA subnetwork.
Table 4.9: Subnetwork ablation study
Network Details
Subnet
Layer
Type
None
No DDA
Pool2
Dense
Pool3
Pool4
Pool2
Residual Pool3
Pool4

4.6.3

Visible /
BPCER @1%
APCER
41.69 ± 17.32
66.75 ± 8.45
29.64 ±17.89
66.61 ± 12.17
68.45 ± 10.99
39.75 ± 14.09
86.92 ± 10.77

Thermal
BPCER @5%
APCER
34.67 ± 15.99
53.32 ± 11.79
13.78 ± 7.11
51.97 ± 19.99
45.11 ± 14.49
18.99± 10.17
66.21± 10.11

Visible
BPCER @1%
APCER
64.32 ± 2.79
62.68 ± 9.99
18.7 ± 1.77
71.47 ± 23.55
68.24 ± 12.9
20.69 ± 3.22
95.9 ± 1.05

/ NIR
BPCER @5%
APCER
50.92 ± 4.71
71.47 ± 23.55
9.95 ± 1.31
55.66 ± 19.44
50.11 ± 14.49
10.37 ± 1.06
79.64 ± 5.28

Embedding Dimensionality Study

In deep learning, high dimensionality is a topic of concern with respect to both model
weights and data representation. The final layers of a classification model are gener-
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ally comprised of one or more fully connected layers. Therefore, a high-dimensional
feature embedding can result in over parameterization in the classifier. We studied
the effect of increasing and decreasing the embedding dimensionality of the CD-PAD
target and inference networks. The results of this study for visible to thermal CDPAD are presented in Table 4.10, and the results for visible to NIR training are in
Table 4.11.
Since changing the embedding size requires randomly initializing the final fully
connected layer of the Light CNN base network, all of the embedding sizes considered, 128 through 1024, have randomly initialized weights generated using the He
method (He et al. (2015)). We know how the CD-PAD network performs when the
base network is fully pretrained, this provides additional insight into whether or not
adapting additional parameters can help or harm performance.
Table 4.10: Varying the image embedding dimensionality for the thermal domain of
WMCA
Embed.
Size
128

Train Params
4,404,053

256

8,600,149

512
1024

16,992,341
33,776,725

BPCER @
1% APCER
54.90 ± 27.18
50.46 ±
23.49
81.01 ± 5.34
62.37 ± 14.44

BPCER @
5% APCER
18.33 ±
7.39
21.06 ± 8.65

AUC
0.926 ±
0.015
0.884 ± 0.050

38.90 ± 7.15
26.04 ± 6.11

0.896 ± 0.020
0.912 ± 0.029

For a point of comparison, the CD-PAD network with the DDA subnetwork that
uses pre-trained weights in the fully connected layer only has 210,517 parameters
that can be adapted over the course of both stages of training. It is clear that
increasing the feature size to 1024 raises the over parameterization problem since
BPCER performance at 1% APCER increases by 20.68% and 25.83% for thermal
and NIR cross-domain training respectively compared against the “No DDA” baseline
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Table 4.11: Varying the image embedding dimensionality for the NIR domain of
WMCA
Embed.
Size
128
256

8,600,149

BPCER @
1% APCER
61.64 ±
1.58
70.09 ± 10.09

512
1024

16,992,341
33,776,725

68.75 ± 3.95
90.15 ± 4.37

from Table 4.9.

Train Params
4,404,053

BPCER @
5% APCER
11.97 ± 0.77

AUC
0.945 ± 0.007

10.49 ±
3.20
11.01 ± 1.61
50.75 ± 21.86

0.967 ±
0.011
0.956 ± 0.005
0.917 ± 0.026
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Chapter 5

CASIA-SURF Development

In this chapter, the additional analysis involved in applying the CD-PAD method
to the CASIA-Surf dataset is expanded upon. Limitations of the data in the target
domain necessitated additional experimentation with the CD-PAD method.

5.1

Single Mode Baselines

First, the baseline expectation for PAD performance must be established for each of
the imaging modalities individually. Previously we have seen that infrared images
are more discriminable for the PAD task using thermal and NIR from WMCA and
NIR from MSSPOOF. Casia-Surf has significant quality differences, particularly in
the NIR domain, so it is unknown if it is suitable for the CD-PAD approach.
Comparing the results from the single mode baselines, the NIR image domain
does not show enough improvement over visible to provide a desirable “target” for
cross-domain training. In Figure 5.1 the ROC curves show that for this dataset
the NIR baseline has a higher BPCER for low values of APCER than the visible
baseline. Adding a DDA subnetwork to the target stream improved the single mode
PAD performance with NIR to a level that could make the NIR image representation
a suitable target.
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In Table 5.1 side by side comparisons are shown for the different single mode
baselines considered for CASIA-Surf. Introducing the DDA subnetwork into the single
mode networks provides a performance boost for NIR, but does not provide the
same effect for visible imagery. CD-PAD*, the modified CD-PAD network with an
additional “target” domain DDA subnetwork, is able to utilize the improvement in
the NIR domain.
While CD-PAD* does slightly improve results with CASIA-Surf, this study indicates that for optimal cross-domain performance the quality of the “target” domain
data should at least be similar to the “source”.
Table 5.1: Results for single modal baselines on the Casia-Surf dataset
Method
MCCNN(NIR)
George et al.
(2020)
MCCNN(Visible)
George et al.
(2020)
NIR (with DDA)
Visible
(with
DDA)
CD-PAD
CD-PAD*

BPCER @ 1%
APCER
85.98± 0.07

BPCER @ 5%
APCER
65.93 ± 3.78

AUC
0.843 ± 0.028

65.64 ± 12.79

39.35 ± 15.89

0.911 ± 0.048

19.42 ± 9.93
63.16 ± 11.01

3.64 ± 2.41
35.66 ± 13.95

0.991 ± 0.004
0.923 ± 0.042

61.02 ± 14.37
55.22 ± 4.20

26.18 ± 5.23
21.94 ± 2.40

0.939 ± 0.015
0.957 ± 0.003
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Figure 5.1: ROC curves for the different single mode configurations for CAIA-Surf.
Adding an additional DDA subnetwork to the target stream
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Chapter 6

Discussion

6.1

Data Challenges

As generalizability is a concern for any deep learning model, it is important to evaluate
on multiple data sets to ensure that a new approach is not overly specific in its
effectiveness. For this research we specifically sought out PAD datasets that contain
mutliple imaging domains, namely visible and infrared.

6.1.1

CASIA-SURF

A primary concern with CASIA-Surf has to do with the relative scale of the source
and target data. In Table 6.1 the average number of pixels per raw image is compared
for the different subsets and split by domain. In biometric applications that use the
face the typical scale comparison metric is distance between the eyes, however face
landmark detection is primarily trained on visible imagery and this analysis could
not be performed with the NIR data. On average an image from the source domain
contains between three and four times as many pixels as an image in the target
domain.
Examples of a random selection of input images for each domain are shown in
Figure 6.1 where it is evident the lack of fine detail contained in some of the target
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Figure 6.1: Raw images in the CASIA-Surf dataset vary in size within both spectral
domains, however the scale issues are more pronounced in the NIR target domain.
Left: Examples of pre-processed visible images. Right: Examples of pre-processed
NIR images showing higher degree of pixelation.
images. This is less ideal for an application like CD-PAD where the NIR representation is used to enhance the Visible representation instead of acting as supplementary
information at evaluation time.
Table 6.1: Results for single modal baselines on the Casia-Surf CeFA dataset
subset

Visible

NIR

Vis/NIR

Train

76415.35 ±
25258.45
78705.52 ±
26226.79
83058.53 ±
28351.04

20663.64 ±
6553.67
20641.35 ±
6672.19
21656.62 ±
7127.36

3.69

Test
Dev

3.81
3.83
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Chapter 7

Conclusions

We proposed a new domain adaptation framework called CD-PAD that utilized mutlimodal data during training to improve visible based PAD for face recognition systems.
we proposed a new CD-PAD framework, a domain adaptation approach to PAD for
face recognition.
The goal of this framework was to utilize multi-modal face data during training
to improve PAD when deployed on a facial recognition system that is only comprised
of sensors and imagery in the visible spectrum.
qualitative analysis indicates an improvement in the clustering and separability of
the bonafide and attack feature space.
To this end, we introduced (1) a new CD-PAD framework that increases the
separability of bonafide and presentation attacks using only visible spectrum imagery,
(2) an IDR technique for enhanced PAD and stability during optimization, and (3) a
DDA subnetwork to transform representations between visible and infrared domains.
We found that our CD-PAD framework was able to significantly reduce the BPCER @
1% APCER by 57.46%, 62.17% and 29.37% on the WMCA (NIR), WMCA (thermal),
and MSSpoof (NIR) protocols. Moreover, we found that our proposed IDR resulted
in better PAD performance than previous MMD and DIL techniques. The results
imply that the CD-PAD framework is capable of providing very discriminative PAD
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while reducing the number/type of operation sensors, which enables less complex and
more cost efficient PAD systems.
Additional experiments on the CASIA-Surf dataset shows that CD-PAD does
require suitable image quality in the target domain. The modification of CD-PAD*
still provides a modest improvement of the BPCER at 1% APCER by 7.94% and
BPCER at 5% APCER by 13.72%.
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recognition with custom silicone masks. In 2018 IEEE 9th International Conference
on Biometrics Theory, Applications and Systems (BTAS), pages 1–7, 2018. doi:
10.1109/BTAS.2018.8698550.

58
Jane Bromley, Isabelle Guyon, Yann LeCun, Eduard Säckinger, and Roopak Shah.
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Ketan Kotwal, Sushil Bhattacharjee, and Sébastien Marcel. Multispectral deep embeddings as a countermeasure to custom silicone mask presentation attacks. IEEE
Transactions on Biometrics, Behavior, and Identity Science, 1(4):238–251, 2019.
doi: 10.1109/TBIOM.2019.2939421.
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